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THE AFTERMATH OF BAILEY v. UNITED
STATES:* SHOULD POSSESSION REPLACE




Title 18, United States Code, section 924(c)(1), establishes a
separate offense which enhances the punishment of a defendant
116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
*Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the
use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for
five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short barreled
shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten
years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment
for thirty years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction
under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive
device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to
life imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence
of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the
term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was
used or carried.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1996).
*" Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998.
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who commits a violent crime or drug trafficking offense and uses
or carries a firearm during or in relation to either offense.' The
statute imposes a sentence of five to thirty years that must be
served consecutively, not concurrently, with the sentence for the
predicate offense.2 The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of
Bailey v United States changes the interpretation of this statute
and significantly narrows its application by providing a "bright-line
test" that aids defense counsel.4 The decision has been viewed as
a surprise pro-defendant outcome by a conservative court, and a
defeat for the U.S. Justice Department's war against drugs. In
addition to convictions challenged on direct appeal, it has been
' Title 18, United States Code, section 924(c)(1) was enacted after
Representative Richard H. Poff (R-Va.) introduced it as a floor amendment in
1968. United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
statement of Representative Poff that "[t]he prosecution for the basic felony and
the prosecution under [his] substitute would constitute one proceeding out of
which two separate penalties may grow"). Representative Poff stated that the
purpose of the amendment was to "persuade the man who is tempted to commit
a federal felony to leave his gun at home." Id. at 1327-28 (citing 114 CONG.
REC. S22231 (1968)). The statute was later amended several times, including a
modification in 1986 to add the using or carrying of firearms in relation to a
drug trafficking crime. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 104(a)(2)(A)-(E), 100 Stat. 449, 457 (1986).
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The statute imposes sentences of 10 years for using
or carrying a "short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon" and 30
years for "machinegun or a destructive device or ... a firearm with a silencer
or muffler." Id. Second or subsequent § 924(c)(1) convictions are subject to a
mandatory term of 20 years, "and if the firearm is a machinegun or destructive
device, or was equipped with a silencer or muffler, to life imprisonment without
release." Id.
3 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
4 David B. Byrne, Jr. et al., Recent Decisions, 57 ALA. LAW. 114, 116
(1996).
' Joan Biskipic, Court Reverses Drug Convictions: Active Use of Firearm
Neededfor Additional Sentence, Justices Rule, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1995, at A3.
It has been argued, however, that mandatory sentences for offenses accompanied
by a gun are not effective in deterring either the "flow of illegal drugs" or the
"overall level of serious crime." MATTHEW G. YEAGER, Do MANDATORY
PRISON SENTENCES FOR HANDGUN OFFENDERS CURB VIOLENT CRIME?:
TECHNICAL REPORT ONE FROM THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
2 (1976).
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noted that due to the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, hundreds
of prisoners are now eligible for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief' for harsh
consecutive sentences stemming from § 924(c)(1) convictions under
the pre-Bailey interpretation of "use."7 Aside from the retroactive
effect of the decision, Bailey also clearly challenges the future of
§ 924(c)(1).
This Note will analyze the retroactive effect of Bailey,
particularly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,'
and will recommend a proposal to amend § 924(c)(1) to replace
"uses or carries" with "possession" of a firearm during or in
relation to a violent crime or drug trafficking offense. In doing so,
Part I of this Note will first place the issue in context by providing
a brief history of § 924(c)(1). Part II will discuss the Supreme
Court's decision in Bailey. Part III will then analyze how the
Second Circuit is handling the post-Bailey deluge, which it does in
most cases, by stretching the law to uphold the pre-Bailey sentence.
6 Title 28, United States Code, section 2255 enables a prisoner in custody
to collaterally attack his or her sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed
was unconstitutional, contrary to United States law, handed down by a court
without proper jurisdiction, over the legal maximum or otherwise subject to
attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
7 David B. Smith, Resources, Research and Results: Reflections on Bailey
v. United States, 11 CRIM. JUST. 40 (1996). The United States Sentencing
Commission reported that 1973 defendants were sentenced under § 924(c)(1) in
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995. Id. at 41. A total of 10,000 people
are estimated to be in prison under § 924(c)(1). Stephanie Stone, Eastern District
of Virginia Rules Bailey Gun 'Use'Applies Retroactively, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS,
Jan. 10, 1996, at 3038, available in 1996 WL 257913. See 143 CONG. REC.
S379, 405 (referring to Sentencing Commission statistics estimating that more
than 9000 armed felons were convicted under § 924(c) from April 1991 to
October 1995).
" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of the leading
jurisdictions in terms of § 924(c) case law and has been noted along with the
Third Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit for adhering to a traditional
interpretation of "use" under § 924(c)(1), even before Bailey v. United States.
Jamilla A. Moore, These Are Drugs. These Are Drugs Using Guns. Any
Questions? An Analysis of the Diverse Applications of 18 US.C. Section
924(c)(1), 30 CAL. W. L. REv. 179, 185 (1993). This Note primarily focuses on
cases decided by the Second Circuit and the district courts in New York, but
incorporates differences and similarities of views among other federal circuit
courts where relevant.
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Specifically, this Note will discuss the various means by which the
Second Circuit upholds pre-Bailey sentences, including the use of
harmless error,9 the Pinkerton theory of liability' ° and, finally,
the concept of "sentencing packages" which the Second Circuit has
relied on to resentence defendants with enhanced terms of impris-
onment even after the § 924(c) conviction has been retroactively
reversed pursuant to Bailey." This Note concludes that in light of
the strained interpretation of § 924(c)(1) and the ad hoc use of the
Sentencing Guidelines, § 924(c)(1) should either be amended to
include possession where the firearm is in close proximity to the
drugs or, in the alternative, abolished altogether and the matter
referred to the sentencing commission.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 924(c)
The language of § 924(c) has been amended eight times by six
public laws since 1968.12 The statute has been subject to
' The Second Circuit upholds sentences on the ground that even if the jury
instruction was erroneous as to "use," the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
convict under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1). See United States v. Pimentel,
83 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996).
'0 The Second Circuit upholds post-Bailey convictions on the ground that,
even if the defendant was wrongfully convicted of aiding and abetting, which
requires some act to facilitate the crime, the convictions can be upheld if the jury
could have found that the using or carrying of the firearm was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant. See Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677; United States v.
Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1241 (2d Cir. 1996); Pimentel, 83 F.3d at 58.
' The Second Circuit imposes a two-level enhancement for possession of a
weapon related to the underlying drug trafficking conviction under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2D1. l(b)(1) (1995). See, e.g., United States v. Bermudez, 82 F.3d 548, 550 (2d
Cir. 1996); Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677. The two-level enhancement could raise the
sentence as much as 60 to 100 months. See infra note 157 (discussing the effect
of a two-level sentencing enhancement).
2 Section 924(c) was amended several times between 1984 and 1994. See,
e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 110102(c)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1998 (1994) (adding a semi-automatic
weapon to the list of firearms punishable by 10 years imprisonment); Crime
Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829 (1990)
(adding imprisonment for 10 years if the firearm is a short barreled rifle or a
BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
piece-meal tinkering depending on the public policy of the moment
which has led to incongruent results and the ultimate need for the
Bailey decision.
Enacted in the wake of the assassinations of Robert Kennedy
and Martin Luther King, Jr., the Federal Gun Control Act of
196813 ("Gun Control Act") aimed to prevent gun distributors
from selling to buyers across state lines, to aid in the enforcement
of state gun control laws and to prohibit the sale of firearms to
certain classes, including convicted felons and drug users.14 The
enhanced punishment for using or carrying a gun in relation to a
crime first appeared as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.15
short barreled shotgun, and adding destructive device wherever machinegun
appears); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 6212, 102 Stat.
4181, 4360 (1988) (replacing the previous definition of a drug trafficking
offense, "'violation of Federal law involving distribution, manufacture, or
importation of any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Con-
trolled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 802)"' with "'punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§1 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. [§] 1901 et seq.).'); id. § 6460, 102 Stat.
4181, 4373 (increasing term of sentence from 10 to 30 years for a machinegun,
from 10 to 20 years for second or subsequent conviction and from 20 years to
life imprisonment without release for a second or subsequent conviction
involving a machinegun); Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)-(E), 100 Stat. 449, 457 (1986) (amending statute to reach
the carrying or using of a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking
offense and imposing more severe penalties for machineguns or firearms
equipped with a silencer or muffler); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138, 2138-39 (1984) (substituting
minimum sentencing of one to 10 years for a first offense with a mandatory
determinate sentence of five years and replacing a minimum range of five to 25
years for a second conviction, with a mandatory sentence of 10 years).
"3 Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (1968).
14 GERALD D. ROBIN, VIOLENT CRIME AND GuN CONTROL 9-20,85 (1991).
"5 The amendment to the Gun Control Act was introduced from the floor by
Representative Poff. 114 CONG. REC. S22231-48 (1968). For further discussion
of the legislative history of § 924(c)(1), see Thomas Clare, Smith v. United
States and the Modern Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c): A Proposal
to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 815
(1994); Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A
Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of "Use A Firearm, "73 WASH.
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The original version read as follows:
(c) Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which
may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the com-
mission of any felony which may be prose-
cuted in a court of the United States, shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not
less than one year nor more than 10 years. In
the case of his second or subsequent convic-
tion under this subsection, such person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
not less than five years nor more than 25
years, and, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the court shall not suspend the
sentence of such person or give him a proba-
tionary sentence.1
6
Unlike the version today that applies only to carrying or using
a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking or violent
crime, the original version applied to both the use of a gun to
commit any felony and the unlawful carrying of a gun during the
commission of any felony. 7 Therefore, as long as the defendant
had a permit for the gun, the defendant who carried the gun during
U. L.Q. 1159 (1995); Moore, supra note 8, at 181; Michael J. Riordan, Using a
Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the
Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision of 18 US.C. Section 924(c) (1),
30 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 40 (1990).
16 Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
1213, 1224 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988)). During the
congressional debates relating to the act, Senator Murphy stated that the law
"will make every criminal and would-be criminal think twice before using or
even carrying a firearm." Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1191 n. 157
(citing 114 CONG. REC. S27141, 27144 (1968)) (statement of Senator Murphy).
The Supreme Court in Bailey argued that the original version of § 924(c)
illustrated that Congress intended a narrower meaning of "use," concluding that
"uses to commit" would not cover nearby storage of a gun. Bailey v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 507 (1995).
17 Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1191.
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the commission of a felony would not be subject to the § 924(c)(1)
sentencing enhancement." In addition to this loophole, the
original version has also been criticized as ineffective because it
failed to ban parole under the § 924(c)(1) sentence, and was
applied by the court as a cumulative sentencing provision rather
than a separate substantive offense.' 9
In 1984, § 924(c) was amended upon the enactment of section
1005 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 20 This amendment
merged the separate sections of use and carry,2' revising the
statute as follows:
(c) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of
violence, including a crime of violence which
provides for an enhanced punishment if committed
by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device, for which he may be prosecuted in a court
of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall,
in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence, be sentenced to imprisonment
for five years. In the case of his second or subse-
quent conviction under this subsection such person
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court shall not place on probation or suspend the
Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1191.
19 Clare, supra note 15, at 822 (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S.
6 (1978) and Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980)) (proposing that
enhancement for the firearm related substantive crime merged with and displaced
any separate enhancement under § 924(c)).
20 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138, 2138-39 (1984).
21 Legislative history is scarce as to why sections § 924(c)(1) and (c)(2) were
combined. "Carrying," however, was distinguished from "using a gun" in the
following Senate Report excerpt:
Evidence that the defendant had a gun in his pocket but did not display
it, or refer to it, could nevertheless support a conviction for carrying
a firearm in relation to the crime if from the circumstances or
otherwise it could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun
if a contingency arose ....
Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1195 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, at
314 n.10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3492 n. 10).
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sentence of any person convicted of a violation of
this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment including that
imposed for the crime of violence in which the
firearm was used or carried. No person sentenced
under this subsection shall be eligible for parole
during the term of imprisonment imposed herein.22
Although the statute was broadened by the deletion of "unlaw-
ful" so that a felon with a gun permit could not escape the scope
of § 924(c), it significantly narrowed the application of § 924(c) by
punishing the use of a firearm "during or in relation to a violent
crime" 23 rather than punishing the use of a firearm "to commit
any felony., 24 The legislature cured the problem of concurrent
sentencing that arose under the prior version by adding the
language "in addition to the punishment for such crime of violence"
to ensure that an offense under this section would be treated
distinctly from the underlying offense. 25 Finally, the statute
imposed definite mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment that
replaced the judge's discretion under the former version.26
22 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005,
98 Stat. 2138, 2138-39. The government argued in Bailey that "carry" and "use"
should be understood as overlapping because the 1984 amendment stripped the
terms of their original meanings. Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 508
(1995).
23 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005,
98 Stat. 2138.
24 Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
1223. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 2138, 2138-39 (applying also to "carrying" which was formerly "carrying
during any crime of violence"); United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250,
254 (2d Cir. 1988) (referring to the significance of "during and in relation to");
Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1194.
25 The original version of § 924(c), which allowed for more flexible
sentencing, provided for imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than
10 years for the use of a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States. Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1223; Clare, supra note 15, at 824.
26 Clare, supra note 15, at 824. The 1984 amendment to § 924(c) provided
for a mandatory five-year term of imprisonment for using a gun during and in
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Two years later, in 1986, section 104 of the Firearm Owners'
Protection Act of 198627 amended § 924(c) to include mandatory
minimum sentences for drug trafficking crimes. 2 The amendment
also provided for a ten-year prison term for carrying or using a
machinegun or firearm with a silencer or muffler and a twenty-year
term for carrying or using such firearms upon a second or subse-
299quent conviction. Section 924(c)(2) was also added to Title 18,
United States Code in 1986, which defined a drug trafficking crime
as "any felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution,
manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
802))."'30 Section 924(c)(3) defined a violent crime as a felony that
"has an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or by its nature,
involved a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
relation to any crime of violence and a term of 10 years for a second or
subsequent conviction under § 924(c); whereas the earlier version provided for
a term ranging from one to 10 years for a first time offender and five to 25 years
upon a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction. Clare, supra note 15, at 823-
24.
27 Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)-(E), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986).
21 Id. (amending § 924(c) by inserting "or drug trafficking crime" before "in
which the firearm was used or carried"). See Moore, supra note 8, at 181
(suggesting that the addition of drug trafficking crime was consistent with the
report of the United States Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime
which recommended the application of § 924(c) to all federal felonies). Despite
the tougher provisions in this legislation relating to crime-related gun use, it was
a significant victory for the National Rifle Association which spent nearly $1.6
million to campaign against the ban of interstate gun sales. ROBIN, supra note 14,
at 24. While a last minute attempt by Congress preserved the prohibition on
interstate gun sales, the legislation removed the ban on interstate transportation
of guns and loosened certain recordkeeping requirements. ROBIN, supra note 14,
at 24.
29 Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)-(E),
100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (amending § 924(c) by striking the period at the end of the
first sentence and inserting, "and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped
with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for ten years").
30 Id. The Controlled Substances Act, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.,
was later amended to include possession with intent to distribute drugs in the
definition of a drug trafficking crime. Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15,
at 1198.
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property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense."'"
Subsequent amendments in 1988, 1990 and 1994 have redefined
a drug trafficking crime, expanded types of firearms covered by the
statute and increased penalties up to life imprisonment without
release.32 Of these recent amendments, the expanded definition of
drug trafficking crime, incorporating possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, has posed problems in determin-
ing how one would "use" a firearm in relation to such a passive
offense.33
Although there were numerous attempts to amend § 924(c)(1)
to replace carrying or using a firearm with possession of a firearm
even before Bailey,34 Bailey has spurred a strong reaction among
"' Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(A)(2), 100
Stat. 449, 456-57.
32 See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §1101, 104 Stat.
4789, 4829 (adding a 10-year sentence if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle or
shotgun and including "or destructive device" wherever machinegun appears);
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181,
4360 (defining drug trafficking crime as any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.) or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S. App. § 1901 et seq.)); id. § 6460, 102 Stat. 4181
(increasing penalties from 10 to 30 years for machineguns, from 10 to 20 years
for a second or subsequent conviction and from 20 years to life imprisonment
without release for a second or subsequent conviction involving a machinegun).
See also Clare, supra note 15, at 824-25 (discussing the legislative history of
§ 924(c) and the effect of the 1986 amendment); Cunningham & Fillmore, supra
note 15, at 1198-99 (discussing remarks by Senator Biden regarding the addition
of "possession with intent to distribute" to definition of drug trafficking crime).
" See United States v. Robinson, 779 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C. 1991)
(citing United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The district
court distinguished the instances of a gun found in a residence in Bruce from a
gun found in a crack house in Robinson. Id. at 609 n.5. Although later reversed
by the Supreme Court in Bailey, the district court concluded that in the later
instance a gun may be "used" because the possession and distribution in a crack
house are intertwined. Id. at 609.
3' Even before Bailey, there were many proposals to amend § 924(c) to
include possession, all of which have failed. See, e.g., H.R. 1488, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (introduced by Representative Barr (R-Ga.)); S. 2305, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Senator Thurmond (R-S.C.)); S. 1241,
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many legislators and law enforcement agents who believe that the
Supreme Court erred in its interpretation." The decision is
considered an invitation to amend the statute to include possession
of a firearm.36 In 1996 and 1997, several bills have been
introduced in the House and Senate for such an amendment.1
7
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Senator Biden (R-N.J.)); S. 1970,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (introduced by Senator Gramm (R-Tex.)); H.R.
2709, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989) (introduced by the Bush administration). See
also Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 15, at 1198-01 (discussing unsuccessful
attempts to add possession). Although successful at the state level, Senator
D'Amato (R-N.Y.) has unsuccessfully attempted to amend § 924(c) to include
a sentence enhancement for those who knowingly possess a firearm during or in
relation to a state crime. See 140 CONG. REC. H5930 (daily ed. July 20, 1994);
140 CONG. REc. S6078 (daily ed. June 19, 1994); 139 CONG. REC. S15386
(daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993) (failing to be enacted despite recommendation of House
and Senate); 137 CONG. REc. S8846 (daily ed. July 11, 1991).
31 Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Allnws File (statement of Senator DeWine (R-Ohio)) [hereinafter
Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996)]. See 143 CONG. REC. S379, 405 (statement of Senator
Helms (R-N.C.) introducing Senate Bill 43, a bill to throttle criminal use of
guns, to "correct[] the Supreme Court's blunder"); 143 CONG. REC. S. 1659,
1663 (statement of Senator Leahy (R-Vt.) introducing Senate Bill 362 which
would replace "carry or use" with "possession" and correct the Bailey decision);
142 CONG. REc. S1976, 1977 (introduction of Senate Bill 1612 by Senator
Helms for Senators Dole, Hatch, Thurmond, Faircloth, Gramm and Feinstein
which aims to crack down on "gun toting thugs" and correct the Supreme
Court's "error of judgement leading to the early release of hundreds of
criminals").
36 Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement by Senator Helms).
But see Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1995) (stating that if
Congress had intended to include a meaning of "use" of a firearm other than
active employment, it could have used "possession" as it has in other gun related
legislation).
17 See S. 43, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); S. 362, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1997); H.R. 3454, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing "to provide
enhanced penalties for discharging or possessing a firearm during a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, and for discharging or using a firearm to
cause serious bodily injury during such a crime"); S. 1945, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996) (aiming to broaden the scope of certain firearm offenses); H.R. 4181,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (providing for increased mandatory minimum
sentences for criminals possessing firearms); H.R. 3698, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
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Despite the view that Bailey did not properly consider the legis-
lative intent of § 924(c)(1), there is no consensus about what
should be the intent of the statute.38 Legislators face the problem
of how to properly draft an amendment of § 924(c)(1) that targets
possession which is related to the underlying offense and exempts
punishment where a gun is found before or after the commission
of the underlying offense, but has no clear relation to the
offense.39 Possession "during or in relation to" the underlying
offense would alleviate inconsistencies by reaching instances where
guns were readily accessible for use in relation to the crime through
the well established doctrine of "constructive possession.,
40
II. BAILEY V. UNITED STATES
Until the Supreme Court decided Bailey, the circuit courts were
split over what "use" under § 924(c)(1) meant.4  Many circuit
courts made no distinction between "use" and "carry," and
essentially construed the statute to cover any possession of a
firearm in relation to a violent crime or drug trafficking offense.42
This included possession of a weapon that was physically available
(1996) (Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Control Act of 1996, Title III)
(enhancing penalties for discharging or possessing a gun during a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime).
38 Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35.
'9 Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Kevin Di Gregory,
referring to the problem posed by Senate Bill 1945 introduced by Senator
DeWine which punishes the use or carrying of a firearm "in close proximity to
illegal drugs or drug proceeds, in close proximity to the location of the arrest or
in close proximity to the location of the drug selling").
40 See Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory). A possession standard would also
provide consistency with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines which provide a
two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm at the time of the drug
trafficking offense. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
11, § 2D1.1(b)(1).
41 Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 505. See Moore, supra note 8, at 182-93 (discussing
the ready access doctrine of "use" followed by the Second and Third Circuits and
the drug fortress theory of "use" followed by the Fifth and Sixth Circuit prior to
the Bailey decision).
4' Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 505.
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to a defendant or possession of a weapon that, if the need arose,
was intended to be used by a defendant. a3 Defendants, for
example, who stored guns in their homes, were convicted of
§ 924(c) violations whether or not they actively used or carried the
gun.
an
The confusion within the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit 5 and its conflicting interpretation
with other circuit courts46 led the United States Supreme Court to
41 United States v. Fermin, 32 F.3d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1994) (convicting
defendant under § 924(c) for a firearm found in the closet); United States v.
Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 217-18 (2d Cir.) (convicting defendant under § 924 (c)(1)
for firearm underneath a mattress), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990); United
States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 1989) (convicting defendant for
a firearm locked inside a safe), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States
v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.) (convicting defendant under § 924(c) for
guns found in a nightstand, dresser, behind chair and against wall), cert denied
sub nom. Bradley v. United States, 493 U.S. 858 (1989). After Bailey, six
Second Circuit decisions were vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for
reconsideration. See Santos v. United States, 116 U.S. 1038 (1996); Colon v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 900 (1996); Vasquez v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 691
(1996); Arroyo v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 663 (1995); Mariette v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 667 (1995); Lanier v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 667 (1995). Of
the above six, four were vacated by the Second Circuit and remanded for
resentencing. Martin Flumenbaum & Brad Karp, Performance in the U.S.
Supreme Court, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 1996, at 3.
At the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Violent and Drug
Trafficking Crimes, Professor David Zlotnick referred to Minnesota cases in
which defendants were convicted under § 924(c)(1) where guns found in
defendants house had no proven relation to the drug crime. Hearing (Sept. 18,
1996), supra note 35.
" Alvarado, 882 F.2d at 654; Meggett, 875 F.2d at 29; Torres, 901 F.2d at
217; Fermin, 32 F.3d at 678. In one case, a woman was convicted under
§ 924(c) for "using" a gun which was found at her boyfriend's home. Bailey
Ruling May Mean Prisoner Releases in Pennsylvania, Nationwide, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 28, 1996, at 2667, available in 1996 WL 259366 [hereinafter
Bailey Ruling].
" United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing
inconsistent results within the District of Columbia Circuit between 1992 and
1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689, rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 501
(1995).
46 See id. at 113-14 (citing cases in every circuit which adopt a view closer
to a "proximity and accessibility" standard than to the "open-ended analysis"
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grant certiorari.47 The confusion arose when different panels of the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Roland Bailey's, but reversed
Candisha Robinson's § 924(c) conviction-both of which were
based on similar facts.48 Sitting en banc, the District of Columbia
Circuit then affirmed both convictions.49 The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Sandra O'Connor, applied a plain meaning
interpretation to § 924(c)(1) and found that the use of a firearm
during or in relation to a violent crime or drug trafficking offense
required "active employment" of such firearm." Under this
interpretation, both Bailey's and Robinson's convictions for using
a firearm under § 924(c)(1) were reversed and the cases were
remanded for an analysis under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1)."
In United States v Robinson,52 Candisha Robinson was
indicted and convicted of several drug related offenses including
possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine
and using or carrying a firearm in the course of the offense in
previously used by the District of Columbia Circuit). For examples of the "open
ended approach" used by the District of Columbia Circuit before Bailey, see
United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Morris,
977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
" Bailey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1689, rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct.
501 (1995).
48 United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, vacated, United States v. Bailey,
4 F.3d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1993), on reh'g, United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106
(D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, Bailey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1689, rev'd,
Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), remanded sub nom., United
States v. Robinson, No. 92-3062, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3700 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
26, 1996) (en banc); Robinson v. United States, 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
aff'd and consolidatedsub nom. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc).
49 Bailey, 36 F.3d. at 108.
50 United States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1995).
"l Id. at 509.
52 779 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd and remanded, United States v.
Robinson, 997 F.2d. 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, Bailey v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 1689, rev'd, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995),
remanded sub nom., United States v. Robinson, No. 92-3062, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3700 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 1996) (en banc).
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violation of § 924(c).53 Robinson was involved with two different
"controlled buys" of cocaine to an undercover officer where drugs
were retrieved from her bedroom closet.54 After the second buy,
the officer searched the closet and found the cocaine, the marked
buy money and an unloaded pistol locked in a trunk.5" Robinson
was subsequently convicted of carrying or using a gun in relation
to the drug offense under § 924(c)(1) and received a sixty-month
sentence.56 The district court denied Robinson's motion for a
judgment of acquittal on the theory that "a reasonable jury could
have concluded that [she] knew of, and had at least constructive
possession of, the items in the trunk. 5 7 The District of Columbia
Circuit, in a divided opinion, later reversed her conviction on the
ground that § 924(c)(1) reaches only actual use, not an unsatisfied
intent to use a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking
offense. The District of Columbia Circuit held that "the mere
proximity of the gun to the drugs was insufficient to support a
conviction under § 924(c)(1).""8 Finally, consolidating Bailey and
Robinson, the court of appeals reheard the cases en banc and in a
divided opinion, the majority affirmed Robinson's conviction on
the basis that the government presented sufficient evidence that the
Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 504; Robinson, 779 F. Supp. at 606.
4 A "controlled buy" is when an undercover law enforcement officer or
confidential informant buys drugs with marked currency.
" Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 504; Robinson, 779 F. Supp. at 608.
56 Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 504. A prosecution expert testified at trial that guns
are used by drug dealers "to protect themselves from other dealers, the police and
their employees." Id. at 507.
17 Robinson, 779 F. Supp. at 608. The court based this determination on
evidence that Robinson lived at the "buy location," the lease was in her name
and her admission that she owned the locker and used it for personal storage. Id.
The court distinguished instances where a defendant is charged with possession
with intent to distribute drugs and noted that such a charge requires actual use
of a gun under § 924(c). The court explained that the passive nature of the
possession count makes the use of a gun in relation to it difficult to determine;
however, where the court finds that the drugs are kept in a crack house, as in the
instant case, the possession and distribution become intertwined. Id. at 608-09.
" Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 504 (citing United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884
(D.C. Cir. 1993)) (noting the dissent's conclusion that the gun protected both
Robinson and the drugs and, therefore, was used in connection with the sale).
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gun was in the proximity of the drugs and accessible to
Robinson."9
In United States v Bailey,6° Roland Bailey was stopped for a
traffic violation, ordered out of the car because he did not have a
license and arrested after the police observed him stick thirty grams
of cocaine into the passenger compartment of the car.6' After the
arrest, at police headquarters, the police searched the trunk and
found cash and a gun. 62 Bailey, like Robinson, was also subse-
quently convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams
or more of cocaine and using or carrying a firearm in relation to
the offense in violation of § 924(c)(1). 63 The District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the conviction on the ground that the jury could
have concluded that Bailey "used" the gun in his trunk "in relation
to" the possession of the cocaine because the gun "had the purpose
of protecting the cash in the trunk, and ... the drugs and money
on Bailey's person., 64 Consolidated and reheard en banc, the
District of Columbia Circuit again affirmed Bailey's § 924 (c)(1)
conviction, finding that there was sufficient evidence to uphold a
conviction of using a firearm.65
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the correct
interpretation of "use" and, ultimately, reversed Robinson's and
Bailey's convictions.66 The Supreme Court reasoned that if
'9 United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the
"open-ended Bruce-Morris-Derr approach" and adopting a "proximity and
accessibility" approach).
60 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'don reh'g, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689, rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct.
501 (1995).
61 Bailey, 995 F.2d at 1113-14.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id at 1119. The court stated that "the Government need only 'prove a
connection between the firearm and an underlying drug offense"' Id. at 1116
(quoting United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
65 United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court
found that the evidence satisfied the "proximity and accessibility" test because
the gun was near the drugs and accessible to Bailey when he handled either the
cash or the drugs. Id
66 United States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1995). The Supreme Court
remanded Bailey and Robinson for a determination of whether either defendant
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Congress had intended to include possession of a gun under
§ 924(c)(1), it could have easily done so, and pointed to legislation
relating to guns incorporating the term "'possess."' 67 Agreeing
with the dissenting opinion of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court refused to interpret "use" as a "'simpl[e] possession with a
floating intent to use."' 68 The Supreme Court concluded that
applying a test of proximity and accessibility would produce "'the
ultimate result ... that possession amounts to 'use' because
possession enhances the defendant's confidence."'
69
The Supreme Court ultimately held that "§ 924(c)(1) requires
evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by
the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in
relation to the predicate offense. 70 In an effort to guide the lower
courts, the Supreme Court stated that the new standard of use as
"active employment," includes "brandishing, displaying, bartering,
striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a
firearm."' The Supreme Court also noted that "use" does not
mean "storage" or the "mere possession of a firearm ... at or near
the site of the drug crime" and that the "inert presence of a firearm,
without more, is not enough to trigger § 924(c)(1)."
72
carried a gun in relation to the drug trafficking offense under § 924(c). Id
67 Id. at 506 (citing "gun-crime statutes" sections 922(g), (), (k), (o)(1) and
930(a)-(b) which use the term "possess"). The Supreme Court also noted that the
legislature was aware of the distinction between "active use" and "'intended
use,"' citing § 924(d)(1) which provides for forfeiture of a weapon if it is
"'used"' or "'intended to be used' in certain crimes. Id. at 507, 509.
68 Id. at 506 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 121 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Williams, J., dissenting)).
69 Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 124-25) (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Williams, J., dissenting)). Finally, the Supreme Court noted other ways
to punish those who possess a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking
offense, such as charging the defendant under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1)
or applying section 2Dl.l(b)(1) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 509.
70 Id. at 505.
71 Id. at 508.
72 Id.
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III. POST-BAILEY: THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF BAILEY V.
UNITED STATES
Recent cases in the Second Circuit and New York district
courts characterize the problems which have arisen in the handling
of appeals of § 924(c) convictions based on the definition of "use"
clarified by the Supreme Court in Bailey.
The New York courts, like many others, have stretched the law
by manipulating several different legal principles to obtain virtually
the same result as the pre-Bailey cases. Specifically, the courts have
invoked legal principles including "harmless error," under which
the court of appeals has indulged in fact-finding to uphold the
erroneous "use" convictions under the "carry" prong of
§ 924(c)(1); 73 the "automobile exception" to the carry prong of
§ 924(c)(1); 74 the Pinkerton doctrine of liability;75 and finally,
the concept of "sentencing packages" which the courts have relied
on to enhance the defendant's original sentence after the
73 Although the Second Circuit has found jury instructions regarding "use"
under § 924(c) to be harmless error where the evidence would have satisfied a
conviction under the "carry" prong, some circuits have remanded the issue for
a new trial. See United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding improper "use" instruction harmless because evidence was sufficient to
convict under "carrying"); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 678 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding erroneous "use" instruction harmless because it "would have been
correct" for conviction under "carry" prong); cf United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d
1244, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 1996) (remanding case for retrial under "carry");
United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
despite "wealth of evidence" provided by government regarding active using and
carrying, case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because it cannot
be determined whether the jury convicted on a proper basis); United States v.
Douglas, 82 F.3d 1315, 1328 (5th Cir.) (remanding case because the "liberal pre-
Bailey instructions" of "use" may have affected the jury verdict, despite finding
the evidence sufficient to convict under "carry"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 241
(1996).
71 See, e.g., Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677-78.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1241 (2d Cir. 1996);
Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55 at 58.
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post-Bailey vacatur.76 Further, there is disparity in the retroactive
effect of Bailey depending on whether the challenge is brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or on direct appeal, as well as
uncertainty about whether charges dismissed pursuant to a plea
agreement may be reinstated pursuant to a post-Bailey challenge.77
Although it could be argued that these problems are specific to
the retroactive effect of Bailey and therefore will have a short term
effect on the state of the law in this area, these appellate decisions
are precedent setting and foreshadow an exception-riddled treatment
of Bailey. Instead of stretching the law to obtain a just result, the
court should adhere to the Supreme Court's narrow treatment of
§ 924(c)(1) because doing so will force the legislature to act to
correct any misinterpretation of the legislative history by the Bailey
court.
A. The "Automobile Exception" to Carry
The post-Bailey findings of harmless error-that defendant
carried but did not "use" the gun-have produced some inconsistent
results, specifically when a drug-dealing defendant had the gun in
an automobile.78 It is clear that after Bailey, the Second Circuit,
along with many others, is defining "carry" more broadly.79 The
following are examples of cases where the court found on appeal
that the defendant's conduct did not satisfy the post-Bailey
76 See, e.g., United States v. Bermudez, 82 F.3d 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1996);
Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677.
77 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
United States v. Gaither, 926 F. Supp. 50 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (mem.).
71 See, e.g., Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 676-78 (finding that gun in car brought to
buy location and within easy reach of defendant was sufficient evidence to
uphold conviction under "carry" prong); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d
616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding gun transported in vehicle and "within reach
and immediately available for use" sufficient evidence of "carrying" under
§ 924(c)); United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395-96 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (finding
evidence that car was used as "drug distribution center" and that defendant knew
gun was in glove compartment adequate to uphold "carry" conviction).
79 See United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1259 (discussing First, Second,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases which apply a broader
interpretation of "carry" after Bailey).
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interpretation of "use," but upheld the conviction under the
"automobile exception" to "carry"; holding any error in the jury
instruction to be harmless, despite the fact that the firearm was
hidden and not on the person of the defendant.
In United States v Giraldo,8 ° a Second Circuit case inter-
preting Bailey, federal agents, with the help of a cooperating
defendant, arrested Giraldo, Fermin and Tellez in a parking lot
while they were attempting to sell two kilograms of cocaine.81
After the arrest, the car in which the drugs were kept was searched
at police headquarters and a gun was found hidden in the change
dish between the two front seats.82 Defendants were charged with
and convicted of distributing and conspiring to distribute narcotics
and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to narcotics
trafficking in violation of § 924(c)(1). 83 The defendants appealed
their convictions on the basis that there was insufficient evidence
to uphold the § 924(c)(1) convictions.84 The court of appeals
reversed the convictions of Giraldo and Tellez, but affirmed
Fermin's conviction under § 924(c)(1).85 Under the "use" prong
of § 924(c)(1), the court found that none of the defendants
"actively employed" the firearm as defined in Bailey.86 However,
under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1), the court found that
Fermin, the owner and driver of the car, carried the gun that was
hidden in the change dish.87 The court upheld Fermin's
§ 924(c)(1) conviction on the basis that the jury could infer that
Fermin knew the contents of the car because he was the custodian
of the car and he held the keys, registration and insurance docu-
ments.88
Other circuits have also adopted various forms of the automo-
bile exception. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
'0 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996).
8' Id. at 672.
82 Id.
" Id at 671.
84 Id.
" Id. at 680.
86 Id. at 675.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 677.
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Circuit convicted a defendant for carrying a gun in violation of
§ 924(c)(1) where a gun was found on a boat that was used to
transport drugs. The court held that "[t]he evidence was sufficient
for a reasonable jury to infer that the loaded gun was within easy
reach of defendant." 9 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that a
defendant was "carrying" a gun which was found on the driver's
side of the dashboard console with drugs, stating that "the firearm
was within reach and immediately available for use."90 The
Seventh Circuit has also found that evidence of a firearm in a
vehicle which was "on [defendant's] person or within his reach,
available for immediate use" is sufficient to support a conviction
for "carrying" a firearm under § 924(c)(1). 9' Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit has also upheld a conviction under the "carry" prong where
a gun was found in the glove compartment of a co-conspirator's car
which was used to bring drugs to the buy location where defendant
was arrested, even when the defendant was in the back seat of the
car.
92
These decisions show that the Second Circuit, as well as other
courts, are making a distinction between a gun that is stored and a
gun which has been moved and placed for transport in a car. One
may question, however, whether hiding a gun in the change
compartment, as in Giraldo, is more worthy of punishment than
hiding a gun in a closet, as in Robinson. The result of such
treatment is that running a crack house is more favorable to a drug
trafficker than selling drugs from a car in a parking lot. Absent a
compelling public policy, different punishment is unjustified in
these two instances when a gun is equally available to the defend-
ant during a drug transaction. An argument could be made that like
89 United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1149, 1154 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 405 (1996).
90 United States v. Riascos-Suares, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 136 (1996).
9' United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1996).
92 United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395-96 (11th Cir.) (relaxing
requirement that gun must be immediately available for use and convictions
under § 924(c)(1) where defendant was in the back seat of the car and the gun
was located in the glove compartment of the front seat), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
241 (1996). See Use of Firearm In Relation to Drug Trafficking Offense- 'Carry'
Prong, MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 6, 1996, at 4.
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the automobile exceptions in the context of searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment, there is less expectation of privacy
and greater danger to the public where illegal conduct occurs in an
automobile rather than in a residence.93 However, this does not
advance the purpose of § 924(c)(1) which is to keep guns out of
drug transactions, nor does it address the potential danger to nearby
tenants and their families who, unlike a passerby on the street, are
trapped in their homes near the dangerous conduct.
9 4
B. The Pinkerton Theory of Liability Applied to Using and
Carrying a Firearm Under § 924(c)(1)
Although some circuits are undecided about whether a
defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting under
§ 924(c)(1), the Second Circuit has convicted defendants under
both a Pinkerton theory of liability95 and an aiding and abetting
theory.96  Because the recent decision of Medina v United
" See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (finding lesser expectation
of privacy in a car compared to a home or office); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983) (extending the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Long
allowed the search for weapons in the passenger compartment of an automobile
without probable cause. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051.
94 See United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(quoting statement of Representative Poff, 114 CONG. REC. S22231 (1968)).
9' The Pinkerton theory of liability is used to find a co-conspirator liable for
any crime committed by another party to the agreement where he or she could
have reasonably foreseen the criminal conduct, such as where the crime
committed by the other party was the object of the conspiracy or the natural
consequence of the unlawful agreement. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946) (finding that defendant conspired to violate Internal Revenue Code,
despite the fact that defendant did not assist in the actual commission of the
offense).
96 Aiding and abetting is a form of accomplice liability that holds a
defendant accountable for the actions of a primary party where it is proven that
the defendant intentionally assisted the primary party in the unlawful conduct.
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 410 n.2 (1994) (citing
People v. Carter, 330 N.W.2d 314, 322 (1982)) (suggesting that aiding and
abetting is a derivative offense). According to the Manual of Model Criminal
Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, "it is not clear whether it is possible to
aid and abet this crime" (referring to § 924(c)); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL
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States97 requires an act in furtherance of the substantive crime to
convict a defendant of aiding and abetting in the unlawful
conduct,98 the courts have increasingly relied on the much looser
Pinkerton theory of liability which allows for the conviction of a
co-conspirator under the standard of reasonable foreseeability.99
The Second Circuit has stretched the law to uphold the pre-Bailey
standard of "use" by applying this theory of liability to co-
conspirators, thereby producing inconsistent results. 00
The Pinkerton theory of liability was initially mentioned in the
post-Bailey context by the Second Circuit in Giraldo.'O° In its
discussion of the § 924(c)(1) convictions of Giraldo and Tellez, the
Second Circuit stated that "'a person cannot be said to 'carry' a
firearm without at least a showing that the gun is within reach
during the commission of the drug offense."",10 2 However, where
the gun was shown to be "within reach of one defendant, but not
within reach of the other defendants, the others may also be found
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, ch. 8, § 8.19U (July 1996). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a defendant may be
vicariously liable for the acts of others under § 924(c) if the government can
prove that the carrying or using of the firearm was "reasonably foreseeable" and
"in furtherance of the offense." MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, ch. 6, § 6.18.924c
(1996) (citing United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 554 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 869
(1991) (suggesting that government must prove that using or carrying of the
firearm was reasonably foreseeable by defendant and in furtherance of the drug
conspiracy).
97 32 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 1996).
98 Id. at 46.
99 See, e.g., United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Massotto, 73 F.3d 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 54 (1996);
United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
'oo See Paese v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 667, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See
also Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Prof. Zlotnick,
suggesting that an amendment to include mandatory minimum sentences for
possession under § 924(c)(1) would not comport with the goal of the statute
because it would reach participants who are "swept" into the crime).
10 Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 676. See supra Part III.A (discussing United States
v. Giraldo).
'02 Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 676 (quoting United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d
250, 253 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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liable for carrying under a Pinkerton or an aiding and abetting
theory."' 3 The Second Circuit found that there was insufficient
evidence to support an aiding and abetting charge because no
evidence was presented that Tellez, who rode in the back seat,
"knew that there was a gun in the car, or that he performed any act
to facilitate or encourage its presence."'10 4 Likewise, Giraldo, who
sat in the front passenger seat and could have put his hand on the
gun, could not be convicted on an aiding and abetting charge
because no evidence was presented that he knew the gun was
present.1 °5 The Second Circuit noted the inconsistency in the
affirmation of the driver's (Fermin's) conviction under the carry
prong, and the reversal of the passengers' (Giraldo's and Tellez')
convictions and suggested that if the jury had been given a
Pinkerton instruction, the outcome could have been different.
10 6
After the decision in Giraldo, the Pinkerton theory of liability
was charged to the jury in connection with a § 924(c) violation in
United States v Masotto.'°7 Masotto was charged with and
convicted of various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act ("RICO") violations, arson, robbery and using and
carrying a gun during two different truck robberies.0 8 Masotto
formed a "crew" which he aided through his connection with the
Gambino family by protecting them from competition, providing
storage for hijacked trucks and helping to distribute goods stolen
from the trucks.0 9 On appeal, Masotto contended that under
Medina, the jury must find that a defendant "performed some act
that directly facilitated or encouraged the use or carrying of a
firearm" to convict under § 924(c)."0 He argued that the district
court erred by instructing the jury that they could find him guilty
"03 Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946)).
114 Id. at 667. See United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d. 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding that an aiding and abetting conviction under § 924(c) must be predicated
on a facilitating act).
'o' Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 667.
106 Id. at 676.
107 73 F.3d 1233 (2d Cir. 1996).
'o' Id. at 1235-36.
109 Id. at 1236.
... Id. at 1239; United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1994).
702
BAILEY v. UNITED STATES
of violating § 924(c) under a Pinkerton theory of liability."' The
appellate court upheld Masotto's § 924(c) conviction, reasoning that
the holding of Medina was limited to an aiding and abetting charge
and did not preclude a finding of guilt under a Pinkerton theory of
liability."12 The court explained that "[a] conspirator can be held
responsible for substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirators
to the extent those offenses were reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of acts furthering the unlawful agreement, even if he did
not himself participate in the substantive crimes.""' 3 The evidence
was sufficient to sustain the finding that the using and carrying of
a gun by crew members was foreseeable by Masotto because
testimony was introduced that Masotto knew that the crew members
carried guns during truck robberies and because there was proof
that the guns were actually used in furtherance of the conspiracy to
commit robbery."4
More recently, in United States v Pimentel,"5 the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to traffic narcotics, distribution of and
possession with intent to distribute narcotics and possession and use
of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in
violation of § 924(c)." 6 The evidence showed that Morell, a
co-manager of the Cruz organization, was dealing in heroin and
training Pimentel to succeed him as a manager. "7 On the night
in question, Morell found customers and phoned Berroa, also a
co-manager, to bring heroin to him at a certain location."8 The
organization used an automobile with a secret compartment "which
opened toward the back seat of the car" and held "drugs, money
. Masotto, 73 F.3d at 1239.
112 Id. at 1240.
113 Id at 1239; see United States v. Romero, 897 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092 (1991). In Romero, a co-conspirator's § 924(c)
conviction was upheld under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Evidence that
ammunition was found around the apartment, that other defendants frisked the
informants and that a "triggerman" was stationed in the closet supported the
jury's finding that the use of the gun was foreseeable by the co-conspirator. Id.
"4 Masotto, 73 F.3d at 1242.
I' 83 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
116 Id. at 57.
117 Id.
I's Id.
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and a gun.""' 9 Pimentel accompanied Berroa in the car and sat in
the front seat.12 ° Berroa and Pimentel met up with Morell, who
collected cash from a customer and then got into the car with
them.' 21 Morell ordered Berroa to open the compartment, placed
the money there and took out drugs which he gave to the cus-
tomer.122 Following the transaction, all three were arrested and,
upon a search of the car, heroin, money and a .38 caliber gun were
found. 1
23
Pimentel appealed his conviction on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to support the § 924(c) count and that the
instructions to the jury on that count were erroneous in light of
Bailey.'24 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision
and found that "whether or not Pimentel himself could open the
compartment or reach the gun," there was sufficient evidence to
convict Pimentel of "carrying" under a Pinkerton theory of
liability.'25 The Second Circuit stated that Morell's testimony that
Pimentel was a member of the Cruz organization, that the "[g]un
was routinely kept in the compartment with the money and drugs
for the purposes of protecting the drugs," that he was training
Pimentel and that Pimentel "had reason to believe the gun was in
the compartment" that night, was sufficient to support the jury's
inference that the transport of the gun was foreseeable by
Pimentel. 126 On a Pinkerton theory of liability, "the evidence was
ample to support Pimentel's conviction of carrying a firearm in
violation of § 924(c).' 27
These cases show a further attenuation of the law by using an
"availability-plus-foreseeability" standard under the carry prong in
order to reach instances that fell under "use" before Bailey. This is
19 ld. at 58.





25 Id. at 58. The court also held that despite the flawed instructions as to
"use," the evidence was sufficient to convict under "carry." Id. at 60.
126 Id. at 58-59.
127 Id. at 59.
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specifically egregious after the court in Medina clearly held that
some act facilitating the § 924(c)(1) violation must be shown to
convict under an aiding and abetting charge. 128 Where no act is
facilitating the carrying or using of a gun, other than the knowledge
that the gun is available for use, the Second Circuit is essentially
punishing the constructive possession of the weapon-a standard in
direct conflict with the bright-line test of Bailey.
29
C. Post-Bailey Sentencing Concerns: Plea Agreements,
Resentencing and Consecutive Sentencing Problems
In addition to the circumvention of the narrow "use" test in
Bailey via the automobile exception to "carry" and the increased
reliance on the Pinkerton theory of liability, the post-Bailey cases
have also given rise to inconsistent treatment of defendants
sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, as compared to those
sentenced upon conviction at trial. In general, the successful post-
Bailey plea contestor collaterally attacking his or her sentence may
be released from the remainder of his or her sentence because the
plea agreement is void due to the change in the law, whereas the
successful post-Bailey petitioner challenging his or her conviction
upon direct appeal will be subject to a resentencing where his or
her sentence may be completely refigured. Further confusion results
depending on whether the defendant is proceeding on direct appeal
or raising a § 2255 habeas petition, and if charged with similar gun
conduct in both state and federal court, whether the sentences
should be imposed concurrently or consecutively.
1. Bailey Retroactive Effect on Plea Agreements
Although it is clear that a § 924(c)(1) conviction may be
vacated under a retroactive application of Bailey, it is undecided
whether charges dropped pursuant to a plea agreement based on a
.28 United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1994).
129 See Byrne et al., supra note 4, at 114. The effect of this interpretation has
been noted as imposing strict liability for co-conspirators under § 924(c). See
Paul Silvio Berra Jr., Comment, Co-Conspirator Liability Under 18 US.C.
§ 924(c): Is It Possible to Escape?, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 603.
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§ 924(c)(1) charge may be reinstated once the § 924(c)(1) convic-
tion is vacated. 3 ° The district courts have initially refused to
extend the reasoning of United States v Reguer"' to allow
reinstated charges after the plea agreement is successfully chal-
lenged on Bailey grounds.
13 2
Reguer outlines the government's argument and the general
principles considered by the court in seeking to reinstate dismissed
counts pursuant to a plea agreement that has been breached. The
district court held that where the defendant's conviction under a
plea agreement was vacated due to a change in law, the previously
dismissed counts could be restored by the government on the theory
that the statute of limitations on these counts was tolled, or that the
defendant breached the plea agreement.'33 Under the former
theory, the court held that the traditional purposes of the statute of
limitations did not apply where the lapse in instituting the charges
was due to a plea agreement that was accepted by the defendant
after he had sufficient time to prepare for trial.' The court relied
30 Bailey Ruling, supra note 44, at 2667. Another factor which is discussed
in the following section is that in many cases the original sentence, although
vacated pursuant to Bailey, is enhanced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Because approximately the same amount of time is being served after the
resentencing, the courts may be reluctant to resurrect the dismissed counts
because the bargain has remained substantially similar to the original plea
agreement.
3 ' 901 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (reinstating charges dismissed pursuant
to plea agreement based on the theory that the statute of limitations was tolled
or, in the alternative, that defendant breached the plea agreement by collaterally
attacking the sentence).
13' United States v. Gaither, 926 F. Supp. 50 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (disagreeing
with reasoning of Reguer and concluding that charges dismissed pursuant to a
Bailey plea could not be reinstated on either contract or tolling theory); United
States v. Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (distinguishing Reguer
on the ground that defendant could not be returned to her original position and
charges may therefore not be reinstated).
13' Reguer, 901 F. Supp. at 525.
131 Id. at 526. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971)
(stating that the "[s]tatute of limitations provide predictability by specifying a
limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right
to a fair trial would be prejudiced"); Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1970) (prohibiting defendant from being charged and sentenced on original count
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heavily on the fact that the government acted promptly to reinstate
the charge and distinguished other cases where the government
acted delinquently.135 The court also found that, alternatively, the
original count could be reinstated on contract theory, under which
vacating the plea constituted a revocation of acceptance.'36 The
court further stated that the government dismissed the outstanding
counts in reliance on the plea agreement and that when the
defendant voided his plea, the government may rescind its
agreement to dismiss the pending charges.137
In the context of appeals raised after Bailey, this issue first
arose in United States v Gaither,'38 in which the defendant
successfully challenged his pre-Bailey § 924(c)(1) conviction under
the plea agreement and the government sought to reinstate a
dismissed count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1). 139 Applying principles of contract
law, the court found that because the "defendant's indictment, plea
and incarceration were improper under Bailey, . .. his decision to
seek release [was therefore] entirely proper and not a breach of the
plea agreement.' 40 The court excused the defendant's perfor-
mance under the plea agreement on the tort theory of "supervening
impracticability" or "prevention by government regulation or
order.' 4 ' The government also claimed, relying on Reguer, that
because it was not responsible for the delay in the reversed
sentence, the reinstatement of the original counts was not barred by
would encourage gamesmanship), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
13' Reguer, 901 F. Supp. at 526. See United States v. Liguori, 430 F.2d 842,
851 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lombard, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]f the government
elects to continue with the prosecution of Liguori it must do so promptly"). See
also United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that
reinstatement of charges not allowed where government waited three years).
136 Reguer, 901 F. Supp. at 529.
137 id.
138 926 F. Supp. 50 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (mem.).
"9 Id. at 51. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1) (possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon).
140 Gaither, 926 F. Supp. at 51-52.
141Id. at 52 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 261, 264
(1967)).
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the statute of limitations.'42 The Gaither court disagreed with
Reguer, however, and found that the principles underlying the
statute of limitations did not support a tolling of the statute of
limitations in a criminal case. Despite the "diligence and good faith
by the government," time to recharge the defendant had lapsed.'43
In New York, this issue was discussed in Rodriguez v United
States, 144 in which the defendant pled guilty to various narcotics
law offenses and to a § 924(c) count. 45 Pursuant to the plea, the
government agreed to dismiss the counts of conspiracy to violate
certain other narcotics laws, including possession with intent to
distribute heroin. 46 After the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey,
the defendant petitioned for her sentence to be vacated under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.147 The government agreed that the evidence
supported a reversal of the § 924(c) conviction but argued that the
defendant's motion to vacate was a "tacit repudiation of the Plea
Agreement" nullifying the plea agreement and allowing the
government to reinstate the dismissed indictments. 4  The court
noted that the plea agreement should be governed by contract law
and found no de facto breach because the defendant upheld her
promise to plea to the two counts in the agreement, and the
agreement was silent on the defendant's right to bring a collateral
attack after sentencing. 49 The district court was persuaded by
142 Id. See Reguer, 901 F. Supp. at 527 (stating that although the time lapse
might affect the defense of the case, the resulting prejudice is not the govern-
ment's fault).
143 Gaither, 926 F. Supp. at 53 (stating that the policy behind the statute of
limitations is to protect the accused from prejudice which might arise due to
passage of time). But see United States v. Barron, 940 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (D.
Alaska 1996) (finding that when a defendant collaterally attacks his sentence
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, he "opens himself up to conviction and
sentence on all counts, including those previously dismissed"); United States v.
Viera, 931 F. Supp. 1224, 1227-29 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (disagreeing with Gaither
and finding reinstatement of dismissed charges proper because "defendant's
successful postconviction challenge is a breach of the [plea] agreement").
114 933 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
145 Id at 280.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 281.
149 Id.
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Gaither and held that the charges under the plea agreement must
stand because the parties could not be restored to their original
positions.150 Although plea agreements are generally governed by
principles of contract law, the Rodriguez court noted that the
outcome may differ when constitutional rights are involved.' 5'
The court distinguished Reguer, in which the government was
allowed to reinstate a dismissed indictment after the defendant's
conviction under the plea agreement was vacated due to a change
in law, on the ground that Reguer, unlike Rodriguez, was able to
be returned to his original position before the plea, because his
conviction had only resulted in probation and a fine.'52 Unlike
Reguer, at the time Rodriguez challenged her § 924(c) conviction,
she had already been incarcerated for more than half of her 123-
month sentence.' 53 The court held that this "severe detriment" to
the defendant cannot be erased and that if restoration of the former
indictment was allowed, the government "would have ... the
sizeable benefit of Rodriguez's incarceration without obligating [it]
... to provide anything in return."'
5 4
The few post-Bailey cases addressing the issue of reinstated
charges have been hesitant to read any implied terms into the plea
agreement, however, the issue remains unclear.'55 The govern-
ment should include a provision regarding the effect of the
collateral attack to secure the opportunity to reinstate charges
dismissed pursuant to the agreement.'56 In circumstances like
post-Bailey appeals, when the court is dealing with a defendant
"' Id. at 283. The court also relied on United States v. Youngworth, No.
C-CR-89-81, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12817, at *10 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 1989),
which found that charges could not be reinstated where defendant has already
served nearly a year of prison time. Id at 282-83.
'5' Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 281.
152 Id. at 282. See United States v. Reguer, 901 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
113 Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 282.
114 Id. at 283.
' See United States v. Viera, 931 F. Supp. 1224, 1227-29 (M.D. Pa. 1996);
United States v. Barron, 940 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (D. Alaska 1996) (disagreeing
with the reasoning of Gaither and finding that charges dismissed pursuant to a
plea may be reinstated upon a post-Bailey vacatur).
156 Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 281.
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who has been erroneously incarcerated, it appears reluctant to open
the door to further prosecution.
2. The "Sentencing Package"
Although there will be fewer § 924(c) convictions after Bailey,
there will likely be a corresponding increase in the number of
applications for increased sentences under section 2D1.1(b)(1) of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,'57 which allows the court to
increase the sentence of a defendant by two levels for possession
of a gun.'58 Resentencing a defendant under the U.S. Sentencing
The Sentencing Guidelines are intended to institute more certainty in
sentencing by providing uniform guidelines which judges must apply. If the
defendant is not convicted under § 924(c), the government may seek to impose
a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm at the time of the underlying
drug offense. Depending on the seriousness of the underlying offense, this could
increase a defendant's sentence by as much as 100 months. The offense level is
adjusted according to the type and quantity of controlled substance involved. The
sentence is then figured by incorporating the offense level with the defendant's
criminal history category. For example, if a defendant was convicted of a drug
trafficking crime falling in the highest offense level of 38 and fits the criminal
history category of level I, an original sentence of between 235 and 293 months
would be imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines. Raising this original sentence
by two levels would increase the original sentence to between 292 and 365
months. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, cover
tbl., § 2D1.1, at 80, 82 tbl.
.58 Andrea Wilson, Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey: January 1, 1995-
December 31, 1995: Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 47 MERCER L. REV. 851,
867-68 (1996). It has been questioned whether Bailey would also apply to
sentencing under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines where possession of a gun
enhances the level of the offense. David B. Byrne Jr. & Wilber G. Silberman,
Recent Decisions, 57 ALA. LAW. 249, 250 (1996). It has also been proposed that
§ 924(c) should be thrown out altogether and that the guidelines range should be
used to increase the sentence, without the mandatory minimum imposed by
§ 924(c)(1). See Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Prof.
Zlotnick). Using the guidelines would allow the sentence to fit the crime: longer
terms of imprisonment where the defendant is a major drug trafficker and shorter
terms for low-level participants. Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35
(statement of Prof. Zlotnick). Such a flexible approach would also avoid the
danger that higher mandatory minimums under § 924(c)(1) would dissuade
prosecutors from charging a lower-level defendant for the gun possession.
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Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1) has produced various results
depending on whether the resentencing is raised pursuant to a direct
appeal or a § 2255 habeas petition. In the case of a direct appeal,
the result might differ depending on whether the circuit court
explicitly remanded resentencing to the district court, and in the
instance of a § 2255 petition, whether the defendant consented to
or contested the resentencing."5 9 Although most courts seem to
employ the sentencing package theory for cases on direct appeal,
the question of how to treat § 2255 petitions is unclear and has not
yet reached the circuit courts.
160
In both United States v Bermudez16' and United States v
Giraldo,1 62 defendants' sentences were vacated after a post-Bailey
analysis of "use." Both, however, were remanded for resentencing
Although innovative, this approach would directly oppose the purpose of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines which are intended to provide less judicial discretion and
more certainty in sentencing.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Bermudez, 82 F.3d 548 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996); Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 284
n.2, 285 n.3 (distinguishing Giraldo and Bermudez on the ground that the two-
level enhancement was raised in the context of a direct appeal and distinguishing
cases which have resentenced upon a § 2255 petition on the ground that the
parties either stipulated to the enhancement or that no objection was made by the
petitioner). See United States v. Seibert, Nos. Crim. 91-00324-01 & Civ A
96-0851, 1996 WL 221768, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1996); Sanabria v. United
States, 916 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.P.R. 1996).
160 Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 284. Defendants have also challenged
resentencing, alleging that it violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V (no person "shall be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy for life or limb"). Although the double jeopardy claim has been
struck down, resentencing which results in a greater sentence than that vacated
is still an open question. See Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 1008
(C.D. I11. 1996) (dismissing double jeopardy challenge on ground that once
defendant attacked the "sentence package" he no longer had a reasonable
expectation in the finality of any part of the sentence); United States v. Crowder,
947 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); see also David Heckelman, Voided
Conviction Can Lead to Stiffer Sentence for Drug Dealer, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.
July 29, 1996, at 1.
161 82 F.3d 548 (2d Cir. 1996).
162 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996).
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under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 2Dl.l(b)(1).163 The
Second Circuit has reasoned that because the government could not
have moved for an enhancement under § 924(c)(1) due to double
counting principles, it should be allowed to pursue the enhancement
under the guidelines after the § 924(c)(1) conviction has been
reversed."6 A sentencing judge may, therefore, "increase the
sentence on a specific count where the original sentence was
imposed as part of a 'package' that included a mandatory consecu-
tive sentence which was subsequently found to be invalid."'
65
In contrast to the recently settled opinions of Bermudez and
Giraldo in which the defendant has directly appealed the
§ 924(c)(1) conviction, confusion has arisen about whether a
district court has the proper jurisdiction to resentence when the
defendant challenges the § 924(c)(1) conviction by way of a § 2255
petition. Several district courts have found that they lack a
jurisdictional basis to resentence upon a successful collateral
attack.'66 In Rodriguez v United States, 67 the court stated that
it must act under specific federal statutory authority to resentence
the defendant after his § 924(c)(1) count had been vacated.'68 The
court may resentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which
allows resentencing to comport with Federal Rule of Criminal
"' Bermudez, 82 F.3d at 550; Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677. See FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 2D1.1(b)(1) n.3 (providing
a two-level increase "if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable
that the weapon was connected with the offense").
164 See, e.g., United States v. Hemandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1032 (2d Cir. 1996);
United States v. Howard, 998 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1993). See also FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 2K2.4, at 168 cmt. 2
("Where a sentence [for a violation of § 924(c)(1)] is imposed in conjunction
with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense characteristic for
the possession, use, or discharge of a ... firearm ... is not to be applied in
respect to the guideline for the underlying offense.").
65 Bermudez, 82 F.3d at 550 (quoting United States v. Gelb, 944 F.2d 52,
59 (2d Cir. 1991)).
.66 See Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Dossett v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 686 (D.S.D. 1996); Warner v. United
States, 926 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
167 933 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
168 Id. at 283 (citing United States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.
1996)).
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Procedure 35 or to resentence on the challenged count under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.169 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, how-
ever, only applies when the defendant has provided substantial
assistance or upon motion of the court within seven days. 70 As
to § 2255 jurisdiction, only a "prisoner in custody" may petition to
contest a sentence, and here, only the § 924(c)(1) conviction was
before the court, leaving it no basis to modify the underlying
convictions.' 7' The Rodriguez court addressed the "sentencing
package" theory and found that by challenging the § 924(c)(1)
conviction, the defendant does not bring the "entire sentencing
package before the court. 1 72 The difference, the court reasoned,
was that on direct appeal all sentences are before the appellate
court and are not yet final, as compared to a § 2255 collateral
attack in which the sentences are final, and only a specific sentence
on a specific count is before the district court. 
173
The courts are split on this issue even within the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Subsequent
to the Rodriguez decision, two Southern District cases have
addressed whether the court has jurisdiction to resentence a
defendant pursuant to a post-Bailey vacatur.174 Decided in the
same month, one case adopted the reasoning of Rodriguez and the
other specifically rejected it.
175
169 Id.
170 Id. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 35(a)-(c) (1996).
17 Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 284.
172 Id "The flaw in this theory is that in this instance a federal sentence is
not general or transactional. It is a specific consequence of a specific violation
of a specific federal statute." Id. (quoting United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298,
310 (5th Cir. 1983) (plurality opinion)).
173 Id.
174 Reyes v. United States, 944 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Vasquez v.
United States, 943 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
175 Reyes, 944 F. Supp. at 264 n.4; Vasquez, 943 F. Supp. at 368-69. In
Reyes, the court disagreed with Judge Kram's opinion in Rodriguez and found
that the district court may "'correct' not only, a sentence imposed under § 924,
but also a 'truly interdependent sentence' imposed" on another count. Reyes, 944
F. Supp. at 264 (citing McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982)). However, the Reyes court decided that the
sentencing issue should be decided de novo, allowing the defendant to seek
additional downward departures and adjustments. Id. In Vasquez, however, the
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The district court in Rodriguez pointed out that "an appellate
court has yet to decide whether a successful § 2255 Bailey
petitioner can be resentenced on other counts."'76 The district
courts that have allowed resentencing have justified their juris-
diction on the basis of inherent authority over the original sentenc-
ing intention 77 that a "package" of a certain number of years was
imposed for all convictions. 78 The disparity in opinions is so
divergent that the district courts within New York take opposing
stances on this issue, resulting in no uniformity in how a Bailey
defendant will be treated even in the same state. Because a
two-level enhancement could mean several additional years of
imprisonment, this issue must be promptly addressed by the Second
Circuit.
3. State and Federal Jurisdiction: Concurrent v Consecutive
Sentencing Under § 924(c)(1)
A further area of confusion is whether the mandatory federal
minimum sentence under § 924(c)(1) must run concurrently with
court followed Rodriguez, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to resentence
defendant because only the § 924(c) count was before the court. Vasquez, 943
F. Supp. at 369.
176 Vasquez, 943 F. Supp. at 365 (noting that the district courts were evenly
divided on the issue). The court agreed with the following cases: Warner v.
United States, 926 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Gardiner v. United States,
No. CRIM 4-89-1269(1), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6158 (D. Minn. May 3, 1996);
Beal v. United States, 924 F. Supp. 913, 197 (D. Minn. 1996). The court
disagreed with the following cases: Mixon v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 178
(S.D. Ala. 1996); Pedretti v. United States, No. 3:96-CV-0146/91-CR-358, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6315 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1996).
177 See Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 1008 (C.D. I11. 1996);
Merritt v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Mixon, 926 F.
Supp. at 178; Pedretti, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6315, at *5. In Pedretti, upon
defendant's § 2255 motion, the court vacated the § 924(c) conviction but found
power to reevaluate the sentencing scheme. Id. at *4. The court said it derived
such power from the language of § 2255 and the court's inherent authority to
implement interdependent sentences, the intentions of which were frustrated by
the post-Bailey vacatur. Id. at *5.
718 See McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 917-18 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982).
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a state sentence for similar conduct.'79 Although the Supreme
Court in United States v Gonzales,'8" recently decided that the
plain language of § 924(c)(1) mandates that a federal judge must
impose a sentence under that section consecutively to a previously
imposed state sentence, it did not address whether a state judge
would be required to do the same after a federal sentence had been
imposed under § 924(c)(1). 8' Much like the issues of
resentencing after Bailey, the effect of the Supreme Court's
decision in Gonzales imposes discrepancies in the treatment of
§ 924(c)(1) defendants, depending on how they advance proce-
durally.
In Gonzales, members of the Albuquerque police department
posed as drug dealers and offered to sell drugs to defendants in
what is termed a "reverse sting" operation. 82 Following trial in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, defendants
Gonzales, Hernandez-Diaz, Leon and Perez were convicted of
conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, possession with
intent to distribute marijuana and using or carrying of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime.'83 The defendants had been
previously convicted and sentenced for the same conduct in state
court. 184 Defendants appealed their convictions on several grounds
including that the "district court erred in ruling that they are to
serve their sentence for this crime consecutive to the completion of
their state sentences arising out of the same conduct." '185
179 The statute states that the term of imprisonment under § 924(c)(1) shall
not "run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm
was used or carried." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
80 No. 95-1605, 1997 LEXIS 1489 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1997).
181 Id. at *18.
182 United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 816 (1995), rev'd and remanded,
No. 95-1605, 1997 LEXIS 1489 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1997).
11 Id at 817. Defendant was charged with violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(D) and § 846. The defendantwas also chargedwith 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 and § 924(c)(1).
184 Id.
..5 Id. at 819. Defendants were successful on their other grounds of appeal
including: 1) the application of section 3al.2(b) of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines which adds three levels for assaulting an officer in a manner creating
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The Tenth Circuit found that it must "venture into the thicket
of legislative history" because the plain meaning of "any other term
of imprisonment" in § 924(c)(1) would lead to an absurd
result.8 6 The court illustrated that if "any other term of impris-
onment" applied to state as well as federal sentences, the defendant
would be required to serve the state sentence for the predicate
offense, the five years for the § 924(c)(1) offense and the time for
the underlying federal offense, resulting in "more than double the
custodial price that Congress and the Guidelines set for committing
the total criminal conduct engaged in by the defendants."'87 The
court noted that the legislative history indicated that the § 924(c)
sentence be served prior to "any other offense" and that this would
be impossible if the defendant was already serving a state sen-
tence.18 8 The court also relied on the purpose of U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines section 5G1.3(b) to credit for "guidelines purposes"
defendants who have already served time for the same conduct in
another jurisdiction.8 9 It stated that a result that imposed consec-
utive terms of state and federal imprisonment would render useless
section 5G1.3(b), and held that the sentences should run concur-
rently. 90
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and held that the plain
language of § 924(c)(1) "forbids a federal district court to direct
a substantial risk of serious bodily injury when the defendant knows or has
reason to believe that the person assaulted is a police officer; and 2) the
sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions for possession with intent to
distribute marijuana. Id. at 818.
186 Id. at 820 (citing Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1508
(10th Cir. 1993)).
187 Id. at 821.
188 Id.
"9 Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir.
1994)). U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 5G1.3(b) states that "if ... the
undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully
taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant
offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently
to the undischarged term of imprisonment." See FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5G1.3(b).
90 Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 821.
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that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with
any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."''
Referring to Webster Dictionary, the Supreme Court noted that
the term "any" should be given an expansive definition.'92 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court specifically rejected looking at
the legislative history of § 924(c)(1) and relied solely on the
"straight forward statutory command" which forbids the term of
imprisonment imposed under § 924(c)(1) from running concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment.'93 Disagreeing with the
court of appeals which relied on the Senate report comments
accompanying the 1984 amendment to § 924(c), the Supreme Court
stated that the legislative history only "muddied the waters."'94
The report stated that "the committee intends that the mandatory
sentence under the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the
start of the sentence for the underlying offense."'95 In defending
its plain language interpretation of the statute, the Supreme Court
stated that the court of appeals in relying on such legislative history
both "invented the problem and devised the wrong solution."'96
As noted by the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, the
outcome of the majority's decision "turns on the happenstance of
whether the state or federal prosecution was concluded first.'
197
Agreeing with Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer likewise pointed out
that a defendant who was convicted for using or carrying a firearm
under § 924(c)(1) and also under a similar state statute would be
treated more harshly than a defendant who was sentenced first in
federal court. 98 As both dissents clearly point out, the confusion
in the area of federal and state consecutive sentencing has not been
fully elucidated. Perhaps, like its narrow interpretation of "use" in
Bailey, the Court is forcing the legislature to clarify the statute.
"9' United States v. Gonzales, No. 95-1605, 1997 LEXIS 1489, at * 18 (U.S.
Mar. 3, 1997).
192 Id. at *7.
193 Id. at *7, 9.
194 Id. at *9.
'9' Id. at *9-10.
196 Id. at *14.
197 Id. at * 19.
9 Id. at *24.
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Unfortunately defendants who are subjected to harsh consecutive
sentences under § 924(c)(1) bear the brunt of this problem.
The common ground relating to the sentencing concerns raised
after Bailey in the areas of plea agreements, sentencing packages
and federal and state consecutive terms is that defendants are being
punished differently for the same conduct, depending on how they
advance procedurally. In addition, because the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines provide a sentence enhancement for possession of a
firearm related to a drug trafficking offense, even a defendant
whose sentence is vacated under Bailey will be punished. The
stretching of the law to reach criminal gun use equivalent to
possession, in combination with the existence of the section
2D1.1 (b)(1) sentencing enhancement, leads to the conclusion that
one standard should be applied to the punishment of guns in
relation to drugs. A possession standard would best serve the public
policy behind § 924(c)(1) and cure the inconsistencies resulting
from the unclear legislative history of the statute.
IV THE FUTURE OF § 924(c)(1): AMENDING TO A "POSSESSION"
STANDARD
Firearms have long been an important part of American
life. For many years the armed citizen-soldier was the
country's first line of defense; the "Kentucky" long rifle
opened the frontier; the Winchester repeater "won the
West"; and the Colt revolver "made men equal." Firearms
no longer play a significant role in keeping food on
American tables, yet Americans own and use firearms to
a degree that puzzles many observers. If our frontier has
disappeared, our frontier tradition remains.199
Statistics show the important role of guns in the commission of
crime in our country. The National Crime Survey victimization
report estimated that approximately 837,278 gun crimes are
199 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
GUN CONTROL 69 (1987) (quoting the Report of the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence Task Force on Firearms and Violence).
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committed per year, with over half of the victimizations by
brandishing or displaying the weapon. 00 Further, convictions for
federal drug offenses have increased 213% from 1980 to 1990.201
Specific to the use of guns during drug offenses, a significant
percentage of drug offenses are accomplished with guns. A study
focusing on the carrying and use of a gun in the commission of
criminal acts analyzed data received from questionnaires of 2000
convicted felons in state prisons and found that forty-three to forty-
five percent were armed with a weapon during a drug deal and
twenty-nine percent fired a gun at someone during a drug deal. 2
In light of this problem, two methods of addressing the criminal
use of guns are currently employed: one prohibits the procurement
of firearms by the criminal class and the other deters the use of
guns by criminals by raising the cost of such use.20 3 While the
second approach, accomplished by mandatory sentencing, is
advocated by both liberals and conservatives, there is disagreement
over who should be punished under these sentences. 204 The basis
of the dispute stems from the characterization of the conduct as a
"crime problem" or a "gun problem., 20 5 Conservatives endorse
mandatory sentences for those who "use" a firearm in relation to a
crime, an ad hoc response, while liberals target the "possession" of
the gun, a preventative measure.20 6 While neither side endorses
200 ROBIN, supra note 14, at 2.
201 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: NATIONAL UPDATE 6 (1992).
202 JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. RossI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 80-81 tbl.4.1, 88
(1986).
203 Id. at 8 (proposing that gun legislation has been ineffective because
legislators have not studied the motivation behind a criminal's possession of a
firearm). The use of mandatory sentencing has been criticized as ineffective for
the following reasons: lower sentences are imposed for the underlying crime
when an add-on sentence exists, resulting in the same sentence; overcrowding in
prisons make longer sentences impractical; and the lack of deterrent value
because either criminals do not think that they will be caught or the threat of
guns by a drug dealer's customers and associates is greater than the possible
enhanced sentence if he or she gets caught. Id. at 236-37.
204 ROBIN, supra note 14, at 73.
205 ROBIN, supra note 14, at 73.
206 ROBIN, supra note 14, at 73.
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the extreme positions of an absolute ban on weapons in the hands
of private individuals in all circumstances or "facilitating the
availability of guns to the general public, 2 °7 differences arise in
the middle ground about how to punish or deter the criminal use of
a gun without jeopardizing the rights of the "legitimate gun
owner."
208
Although the possession standard has been criticized on the
ground that it will punish possession of guns found before or after
the transaction, or instances where the gun is stored in the home for
some legitimate purpose, the criticism overlooks the fact that the
gun must still be possessed "during or in relation to the drug
offense., 20 9 The "during or in relation" language will ensure that
possession unrelated to the illegal conduct will not be pun-
ished.210
The problem of criminal gun use in relation to drug offenses
under § 924(c)(1) stems from the fact that dealers have guns to
protect drugs from thieves and customers who also have guns.'
Part of the solution must therefore be to change the expectations of
the parties who enter into these transactions. One way to do this is
to make the gun conduct so costly that it will convince the criminal
to leave his or her gun at home. 2 This is extremely difficult to
accomplish, because the cost of leaving a gun at home may have
life threatening consequences to a defendant. The term "possession"
is so well defined in the law that punishment for such an offense
under § 924(c) would impose one standard on gun-toting drug
dealers and encompass incidents where guns are stored or in the
207 WRIGHT & RossI, supra note 202, at 4.
208 WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 202, at 4. See ROBIN, supra note 14, at 87.
209 See Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory).
210 See Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory).
211 WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 202, at 234-35, 237. The authors note that
guns are carried for self-protection generally, and not for specific use. They
conclude, therefore that the most effective intervention should be aimed at the
decision to carry, not to use the firearm. WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 202, at
235.
212 See WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 202, at 236.
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proximity of drugs through the doctrine of constructive posses-
sion.213 A uniform standard would send a clear signal to take the
guns away from the drug crime by raising the cost to a level which
might affect a defendant's decision to carry or use a gun during the
transaction.
Further, a possession standard will alleviate the need for
convoluted exceptions such as the "automobile exception" to carry
and the increased use of the Pinkerton theory of liability.21 4 If the
gun is possessed in the proximity of the drugs, all who have the
knowledge of it and could potentially use it would be punished
equally: a defendant keeping a gun in the bedside table or in a
closet with drugs would receive the same punishment as a defend-
ant who puts a gun in the change compartment of a car during a
drug transaction. Likewise, a possession standard would alleviate
inconsistent treatment under a Pinkerton theory of liability such as
where a defendant is found guilty when the gun was within his
reach, whereas a defendant ten feet away would be acquitted.
Despite the many amendments to the statute, the legislature has
not provided sufficient legislative history to guide the courts in
reaching consistent and just results. Although Bailey v United
States"1 5 made significant strides in this respect, it can also be
viewed as a challenge to the legislature to provide a clearer
definition of the gun conduct it wishes to punish.
CONCLUSION
In light of a long history of confusion regarding the interpre-
tation of "use" and "carry" under § 924(c)(1), Bailey provided a
bright-line test for "use" under § 924(c)(1). Its retroactive appli-
cation by district and circuit courts shows that the inconsistency the
Supreme Court intended to address is being replaced by the reliance
on new principles such as harmless error, the automobile exception
to carry, the increased reliance on the Pinkerton theory of liability
and disparities in resentencing under section 2Dl.l(b)(1) of the
213 See Hearing (Sept. 18, 1996), supra note 35 (statement of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Kevin Di Gregory).
214 See supra Part III.B (discussing Pinkerton liability under § 924(c)(1)).
215 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In many instances Bailey is not
changing the punishment under § 924(c)(1), but rather it is
stretching the law to uphold the pre-Bailey interpretation of "use":
a possession standard. In light of these post-Bailey inconsistencies,
the legislature should amend the statute to replace the "carrying" or
"using" of a gun under § 924(c) with "possession" of a gun during
or in relation to a drug trafficking offense; the standard that is
already being applied circuitously.
